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Abstract 
 
In a number of countries one observes a steady decline in defined benefits pensions schemes, 
public or private, funded or unfunded, and a simultaneous expansion of defined contributions 
plans. One of the consequences of this trend is to deprive individuals at the time of their 
retirement from the benefit of collective annuitization. Collective annuities can be distinguished 
from individual ones in two ways. First, they tend to be cheaper because of their scale and 
because of inefficiencies in private annuity markets. Second they redistribute resources from 
short-lived to long-lived individuals. Our paper studies the role of collective annuities. Both 
their redistributive incidence and efficiency aspects are accounted for. We assume that lifetime 
is uncertain and that there is a positive correlation between longevity and earnings. Collective 
annuitization (in part or in total) can be imposed on private savings or it can be "bundled" with a 
redistributive pension scheme. We show that the case for applying collective annuitization to 
private savings is weak. The case is stronger when collective annuities are associated with 
redistributive pensions. However, even in that case, collective annuitization may mitigate the 
redistributive benefits associated with the pension system. 
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1 Introduction
In a number of countries we observe today a puzzling trend regarding retirement benefits.
Pension plans, funded or not, public or private, are progressively shifting from being
defined benefits to becoming defined contributions. This trend implies that retirees are
subject to new risks: financial market risk for the funded schemes and longevity risk for
all schemes.
This paper is concerned by this second type of risk. An increasing number of workers
are now offered a lump-sum amount instead of an annuity income at time of retirement.
Admittedly, nobody stops them from purchasing annuities. These would not only pro-
vide insurance against the longevity risk but also offer (at least in principle) a higher
return than traditional investments. However, in reality many retirees are reluctant to
buy an annuity, so much that this behavioral pattern is often referred to as “annuity
puzzle”. Even though a number of papers have recently dealt with this issue, it appears
fair to say that the jury is still out when it comes to the explanation of this puzzle.
Among the usual factors one finds bequest motives, precautionary saving, family sol-
idarity and irrationality; see Brown et al. (2005). Part of the explanation may also
lie in the imperfections of private annuity markets. In reality the rates of return of
individual annuities are much below actuarially fair levels and often significantly less
attractive than the implicit return of collective annuities; see Finkelstein and Poterba
(2000, 2002).
Collective annuities tend to offer much better returns than private annuities for
reasons of scale and of risk pooling. They are however open to the objection that they
can be regressive. It is well known that average longevity tends to increase with income.
The life expectancy gap between high and low income people or between unskilled
manual workers and executives can amount to over 5 years. This has led several people
to show that when taking into account this correlation between longevity and income
public pension scheme are not as progressive as they appear at first sight; see, e.g.,
Coronado et al. (2000).
In this paper, we study the redistributive role of collective annuities. We first assume
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that there is no public pension scheme, but just a mandatory scheme of collective
annuities (Section 2). We show that the case for social annuitization is weak except
when private annuities have a very large loading factor or when the regressive effect
of collective annuities is dominated by their insurance effect. We then look at a more
realistic setting wherein collective annuities are linked to a (linear) pension scheme
(Section 3). We contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension
system and a flat rate (Beveridgean) pension system. Finally, we introduce nonlinear
pension schemes (Section 4).
2 Mandatory collective annuitization
We start by assuming that some fraction of otherwise freely chosen private saving has
to be invested in a collective annuity. The rest is invested in private annuities. The
collective annuity offers the same return to everyone; private annuities, on the other
hand, are responsive to longevity differentials. Private annuities are subject to a loading
factor. Consequently, the collective annuity has, on average, a higher net return than
private annuities. However, for individuals with low longevity this cost wedge is not
sufficient to make the collective annuity preferable to private annuities.
Individuals live at most for two period. Each individual works in the first period and
retires in the second. An individual of type i is characterized by a pair (wi, πi) where wi
is labor productivity in the first period and πi denotes the probability to be alive in the
second period. We assume that wi and πi are positively correlated. Let ci, di, si and
ci denote individual i’s first and second period consumption, saving and labor supply.
Throughout the paper we assume away liquidity constraints so that si can be positive
as well as negative.1 An individual’s (expected) lifetime utility is given by
u(ci − h(ci)) + πiu(di) = u(xi) + πiu(di), (1)
where xi = ci − h(ci) is first period consumption net of the (monetary) disutility of
labor.
1This is of no relevance in the current section. It will, however, become important in the subsequent
sections where a pension system is introduced.
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The interest rate is zero. Individuals can purchase annuities in the private market
with a loading factor β (β ≥ 1). As a result, if all saving is invested in private annuities,
we have di = si/βπi. If instead it is invested in the collective annuity second period
consumption is given by di = si/πˆ, where
1/πˆ =
P
nisiP
niπisi
(2)
is the rate of return of collective annuity.2 More generally, if there is a mandatory share
of saving α to be invested in collective annuities, the second period consumption is given
by di = Risi where:
Ri =
α
πˆ
+
1− α
βπi
. (3)
For future reference, it is important to stress that πˆ is larger than the average survival
probability, π¯. Let us define γi = si/s¯ and rewrite (2) as πˆ =
P
niγiπi. We haveP
niγi = 1 so that
πˆ − π¯ =
X
niπi (γi − 1) = cov (γ, π) > 0.
Given that si is a normal good, cov (w,π) > 0 (positive correlation between productivity
and longevity) implies cov (γ, π) > 0 and thus πˆ > π¯.
2.1 Individual choice
The problem of an individual of type i is given by:
max
cisi
u [wici − h (ci)− si] + πiu
∙
si
µ
α
πˆ
+
1− α
βπi
¶¸
.
The first order conditions are given by
h0 (ci) = wi
u0 (xi) = u0 (di)πiRi.
The solutions to this problem are denoted c∗i = c
∗
i (wi) and s
∗
i = s
∗
i (wi, πi, Ri).
2This expression follows from the budget constraint of the collective annuity: πˆ
?
nisi =
?
niπisi.
As already mentioned, it is possible that the rate of return of collective annuities is smaller than the one
of private annuities for individuals with a low survival probability (so that 1/βπi > 1/πˆ or βπi < πˆ)
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2.2 First-best optimum
The first-best optimum is obtained by maximizing the following Lagrangian:
LFB =
X
ni [ϕi (u (ci − h (ci)) + πiu (di))− μ (ci + πidi − wici)]
where ϕi are social weights. Note that with ϕi = 1, the objective follows the pure
utilitarian approach.
The first order conditions of this problem yield:
ϕiu
0 (xi) = ϕiu
0 (di) = μ
h0 (ci) = wi.
With a pure utilitarian objective we would transfer resources not only from high pro-
ductivity individuals to low productivity ones, but also from short-lived individuals to
long-lived ones. The first redistribution is widely accepted; the second one is more
questionable. Let us illustrate this second type of redistribution with a simple example.
Assume that wi = w and that πi only takes two values with π2 > π1. With uniform
weights, individuals 1 consume the same amount as individuals 2 (d1 = d2 = d) but
over a shorter (expected) lifetime. To be more precise, there is a larger proportion of
type 2 individuals than of type 1 individuals who effectively consume d. Consequently,
on average, individuals of type 1 pay for individuals of type 2. Now, when wages are
also different and under positive correlation (w2 > w1) utilitarism also calls for redis-
tribution from high- to low- wage individuals and the overall direction of redistribution
is ambiguous. The impact of the redistribution according to life expectancies can be
mitigated (or even eliminated) by setting ϕ1 > ϕ2.3
In the remainder of the paper we concentrate on the utilitarian case with ϕi = 1
keeping in mind that it implies a questionable redistribution from short-lived to long-
3For example, consider the following parameters: u (·) = log, h (c) = c2/2, w = 1, π1 = 0, π2 = 1.
We need ϕ1 = 2, ϕ2 = 1 to have both ϕ1u
0 (c1) = ϕ2u
0 (c2) = ϕ2u
0 (d2) with c1 = 1/2, c2 = d2 = 1/4
which are also the laissez-faire levels of consumption.
An other approach is to concavify the flow of utility. Then the social criterion is
?
ni [πiV (u (ci) + u (di)) + (1− πi)V (u (ci))]
where V is a strictly convave transformation. This is the approach of Bommier et al. (2007).
4
lived individuals.4 With a positive correlation between longevity and productivity the
overall direction of (first-best) redistribution is thus ambiguous.
To decentralize the optimum, one needs individualized lump-sum taxes. If β = 1,
the choice of saving will be efficient; so is also the choice of labor. If β > 1, lump-sum
transfers in both periods are required, which amount to controlling saving.
2.3 Optimal degree of mandatory collective annuitization
We now assume that the only instrument available is the parameter α that determines
what share of savings is to be invested in the collective annuity. Utilitarian social welfare
can now be expressed as:
LCA =
X
ni [u (wic∗i − s∗i − h (c∗i )) + πiu (s∗iRi)] (4)
Recall that Ri is defined by (3) and is a function of α. Without further restriction on u,
the relationship between α and Ri is extremely complex. This is because bπ that appears
on the RHS of (3) is itself a function of Ri (through si). To bypass this difficulty assume
for the time being that utility is logarithmic (u = ln) so that ∂s∗i /∂Ri = 0.
5 This, in
turn, implies that bπ does not depend on α. Consequently, we have by differentiating
LCA with respect to α:
∂LCA
∂α
=
X
niπi
si
di
dRi
dα
=
X
ni
πi (βπi − πˆ)
(βπi − πˆ)α+ πˆ
(5)
Focusing on the two polar values of α, we obtain:
∂LCA
∂α
=
βvarπ
πˆ
− (πˆ − βπ¯) π¯
πˆ
for α = 0 (6)
= π¯ − πˆ
β
for α = 1. (7)
To interpret these formulas, first assume that β = 1 and that there is no heterogene-
ity in income. In (6) we have two terms. The first one is positive and represents the
4We shall, however, briefly return to weighted welfare function in Section 4.
5With a logarihtmic specification the second term on the RHS of (4) is given by
πi ln(s∗iRi) = πi ln s
∗
i + πi lnRi,
so that Ri does not affect the solution of the maximization problem.
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insurance role of collective annuities. Recall that in the first-best, one wants to equal-
ize consumptions levels across individuals with different mortality profiles. Thus, for
uniform level of savings invested in annuities, the collective annuitization redistributes
from the short-lived to the long-lived persons. The higher is the variance of π the higher
is the concern for this type of redistribution.
However, for any given return on annuities, savings are higher for long-lived indi-
viduals. Specifically, with the logarithmic utility function we have
si =
πizi
1 + πi
,
where zi = wic∗i − h (c∗i ) is independent of πi. Consequently, part of the redistribution
induced by collective annuitization is offset by lower contributions in collective annuities
from the short-lived individuals. The second term in (6) represents the welfare loss
associated with this effect; it is proportional to cov (γ, π) = (π¯ − πˆ) (which reflects the
link between savings and survival probability).6 To sum up, collective annuitization is
desirable if the first term measuring the redistributive concern dominates the second
one measuring the counter redistributive effect of collective annuities.
These arguments are all for the case where wages are equal. Unequal earnings
further strengthen the odds for a corner solution at α = 0 (and thus the case against
collective annuities). To see this, assume that with equal wages (wi = w) the right hand
side of (6) is positive. Now, a more unequal distribution of wi. leads to an increase in
cov (γ, π) = πˆ − π¯ because γi (the share of saving of type i’s individuals) is a positive
function of πi and wi. The formal proof of this property is somewhat tedious and given
in the Appendix.7 Intuitively, it is not surprising. The point is that since γ increases
both in π and in w, which in turn are positively correlated, the variability of w tends
to strengthen the relationship between π and γ. Put differently, an increase in π now
affects γ in two ways: directly (because γ increases with π) and indirectly because a
higher π goes hand in hand with a higher w (and γ is increasing in w). With a higher
6Recall that γ is proportional to s.
7 It requires an assumption that is stronger than what is needed for the rest of the paper. Specifically,
we assume that π and w are both increasing in i (rather than simply assuming positive correlation
between π and w).
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covariance term, we will go from an optimal positive value of α to a lower level of α or
to a corner solution at α = 0.
Observe that even when the RHS of (6) is positive, it is never optimal to have
full collective annuitization (α = 1) when there is no loading factor associated with
private annuities (β = 1). The right hand side of (7) is then equal to − cov (γ, π)
and is negative. To understand this, let us start again with the case where there is
no income heterogeneity. If there is full collective annuitization, the rate of return on
savings is the same for every type of individuals while savings are higher for long-lived
individuals. In other words, second period consumption will be higher for long-lived
individuals. However, in the first best, consumption levels should be equalized between
the different types of individuals. Thus starting from full collective annuitization, it is
always desirable to introduce individualized annuitization (reduce α) so as to reduce the
redistribution from short to long-lived individuals.8. Introducing income heterogeneity
reinforces this result because highly productive individuals are also the ones who live
long and thus those who save more.
Now let us introduce β > 1. Expression (6) can be rewritten as
∂LCA
∂α
=
varπ (π¯ − πˆ) π¯
πˆ
+ (β − 1) Eπ
2
πˆ
for α = 0,
which shows that a higher level of β makes collective annuities more desirable. This
does not come as a surprise. When the loading factor on private annuities is sufficiently
important, even people who live shorter than the average individuals can find collective
annuities more attractive than individual annuities.
3 Collective annuitization and public pension
In the previous section, there was no public pension scheme. Collective annuities were
just seen as a mandatory scheme in which some fraction of otherwise private savings
had to be invested. We have seen that under these circumstance there are little grounds
for social annuitization as long as longevity and productivity are positively correlated
8This reduction in α does not affect first-period consumption levels (saving and labor supply are
indepednant of α).
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and as long as the loading factor of private annuities is not prohibitive. In reality,
social annuities typically come along with public pensions schemes that are more or less
redistributive. We now consider the case where earnings are subject to a payroll tax
at rate τ which finances annuitized pension benefits that are either earnings related or
uniform.
3.1 Contributive schemes
We now drop the assumption of a loading factor (β > 1) and return to the general class
of (quasi-linear) utility functions as defined by (1).9 We start with the case where the
pension system is contributive (Bismarckian) in the sense that an individual’s annu-
itized pension benefits are proportional to his contributions (payroll taxes). When the
pension system is purely contributive, one might be tempted to think that it is “neu-
tral”. In other words, the payroll tax would be indeterminate. However, the pension
system we consider relies on collective annuitization (with individuals differing not only
in productivity but also in survival probability). Consequently, it is not “completely
contributive” in the sense that benefits are not related to survival probabilities. In other
words, while there is no (explicit) redistribution according to income levels, there is re-
distribution according to mortality levels. The setting is thus not that different from
the one considered in the previous section. The main modification is that individual
contributions are now a fraction of income rather than of savings.
Pension benefit for a worker with productivity wi is
pi =
τ iyi
πˆ
(8)
where yi = wici and where the return of the collective annuity is redefined as
πˆ =
P
niπiyi
y¯
.
Observe that
πˆ − π¯ = cov (y, π)
y¯
. (9)
9A loading factor associated with private annuities would have a similar impact as in the previous
sections. Specifically, it would strengthen the case for collective annuities (which have a higher return)
and thus for public pensions.
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Individuals choose labor supply and savings given the pension scheme. Consequently,
they maximize
Ui = u (wi (1− τ) ci − h (ci)− si) + πiu
µ
si
πi
+ pi
¶
, (10)
where pi is defined by (8), with respect to ci and si.10 The FOCs are given by
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) and h0 (ci) = wi
³
1− τ + πi
πˆ
τ
´
. (11)
Observe that the term (1− τ + πiτ/πˆ) in (11) measures the annuitized pension system’s
net rate of return for individual i (characterized by wi and πi). With a Bismarckian
system this rate does not (directly) depend on wi, but it does increase with πi. The net
return is positive for πi > πˆ > π¯ (and for these individuals we have h0 (ci) > wi). Under
positive correlation between productivity and longevity, the individuals with positive
return are also those with the highest productivities. In other words, high productivity
individuals benefit from collective annuitization.
With a utilitarian objective, the optimal pension system is then obtained by maxi-
mizing
LCP =
X
ni
∙
u (wi (1− τ) c∗i − h (c∗i )− s∗i ) + πiu
µ
s∗i
πi
+
τwic∗i
πˆ
¶¸
,
with respect to τ , where the stars are used to denote the induced solution to the indi-
vidual problem. The FOC is given by
∂LCP
∂τ
=
X
niu0 (ci)
∙³πi
πˆ
− 1
´
yi − τyi
πi
πˆ
∂πˆ
∂τ
¸
= 0,
which can be rearranged to yield
τ =
P
niu0 (ci) yi (πi − πˆ)P
niu0 (ci)wiπi
µ
1
πˆ
∂πˆ
∂τ
¶ . (12)
To interpret this formula, we start by an extreme example in which labor supply is
inelastic (and set at ci = 1 with h(1) = 0) so that the problem of the consumer is:
max
si
u (wi (1− τ)− si) + πiu
µ
si
πi
+
τwi
π¯
¶
.
10Recall that there is no liquidity constraint.
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Without liquidity constraint the solution implies ci = di so that
ci =
wiπ¯
1 + πi
((1− τ) π¯ + τπi) , (13)
which implies that ∂ci/∂πi < 0 as long as τ < π¯/(1 + π¯).
Utilitarian welfare is now given by
LFL =
X
ni
∙
u (wi (1− τ)− s∗i ) + πiu
µ
s∗i
πi
+
τwi
π¯
¶¸
,
so that
∂LFL
∂τ
=
X
niu0 (ci)
hπi
π¯
− 1
i
wi. (14)
This can be rewritten as:
∂LFL
∂τ
=
1
π¯
cov
¡
u0 (c)w, π
¢
− cov (w,π) Eu
0 (c)w
w¯
. (15)
To interpret (14) and (15) we first assume that all individuals have the same wage. In
that case a contributive pension system is desirable because it redistributes income from
short- to long-lived individuals. To see this note that with wi = w¯, (15) becomes:
∂LFL
∂τ
= cov
¡
u0 (c) , π
¢
which is positive as long as τ < π¯/(1+π¯) and s∗ 6= 0.When τ = π¯/(1+π¯) we have s∗ = 0
and cov (u0 (c)π) = 0. The reason for this result is that we use a utilitarian objective
which is invariant to longevity differences. It implies a first-best allocation with identical
yearly consumption for everyone (so that the short-lived pay for the long-lived). With
equal wages, the contributive system is effectively first-best optimal.
When wages are different and positively correlated with πi the second term of (15)
is negative and tends to reduce the tax rate. As to the first term which is positive for
uniform wages, it can turn negative if the utility function is sufficiently concave and the
variance of wi dominates that of πi. In the special case where the utility is logarithmic,
one easily checks from (13) that this covariance is positive (as long as τ < π¯/(1 + π¯)).
We thus may have a positive tax rate that is a compromise between the components of
(15).
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Let us once again stress that a positive first term in (15) (for low payroll taxes and
when the variance of productivities is small) is due to our utilitarian criterion. With
social weights decreasing with π, the case for a positive tax rate would be weaker.
Going back to expression (12) with endogenous labor supply, its numerator receives
the same interpretation as that just given for (14) and (15). As to the denominator, it
reflects the impact of the tax on the returns of the collective annuity (via its impact on
labor supply and incomes). In the vicinity of τ = 0, one shows that it is positive.11
To conclude this section, we have seen that the only reason why a contributive system
with collective annuitization might be desirable is due to a utilitarian bias towards long-
lived individuals. This result is not surprising. The regressive incidence of social security
system when longevity and earnings are positively correlated has been underlined by
several studies; see e.g. Coronado et al. (2000) and Bommier et al. (2006).
As we show in the next subsection, the case for collective annuitization is strength-
ened when it is combined with a redistributive rather than a contributive pension system.
3.2 Flat rate pensions
We now consider the case of a flat rate annual pension. In other words, everyone receives
the same annual benefit but on a lifetime basis those who live longer receive more than
those who die early. The annual pension is now given by
p =
τ
P
wici
π¯
. (16)
The individual optimization problem continues to be given by (10) but with pi = p
defined by (16). The individual FOCs are now given by
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) and h0 (ci) = wi (1− τ) , (17)
where the condition with respect to c has changed because with flat pensions an increase
in (first-period) labor supply does not entitle an individual to extra pension benefits.
11Take the case where h (c) = c2/2. Then we have
dπˆ
dτ
=
Ew2 (πˆ − π)
Ew2
?
πˆ − τ
?
πˆ2 − π
?? .
.
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Utilitarian welfare is given by
LFP =
X
niu (wic∗i (1− τ)− h (c∗i )− s∗i ) + πiu
µ
s∗i
πi
+ p
¶
−μ
X
ni (πip− τwic∗i ) ,
where c∗i and s
∗
i come from individual optimization conditions (and are suitable rede-
fined).
The FOC for an interior maximum are the following:
∂LFP
∂τ
=
X
niu0 (xi) (−wic∗i ) + μ
X
ni
µ
wic∗i + τwi
∂c∗i
∂τ
¶
= 0
∂LFP
∂p
=
X
niπiu0 (di)− μ π¯ = 0.
Combining these two conditions, we obtain:
∂L
∂τ
π¯ +
∂L
∂p
X
niwic∗i = −π¯
X
niu0 (xi)wic∗i
+
X
niπiu0 (di)
X
niwic∗i
+ μτ
X
niwi
∂c∗i
∂τ
= 0,
which can be rewritten as
−π¯ cov
¡
u0 (x) , wc∗
¢
+ cov
¡
u0 (x) , π
¢
+ μτEw
∂c∗
∂τ
= 0,
which in turn yields
τ =
−π¯ cov (u0 (x) , wc∗) + cov (u0 (x) , π)
−μEw∂c
∗
∂τ
. (18)
The denominator of (18) is the usual efficiency term in linear income tax formulas. The
numerator on the other hand measures the redistributive impact. The second term of
the denominator is expected to be negative with a positive correlation between wages
and longevity. It measures the “reverse” redistribution that is brought about by the
collective annuity (that favors the productive who also tend to live longer). This effect
was already present in the previous sections. The new feature brought about by the flat
12
pension is the first term. Its structure and interpretation is standard. A flat pension
that is financed by a proportional payroll tax redistributes from high to low productivity
individuals. The magnitude of this term depends on the inequality of earnings and on
the concavity of the utility function. The optimal payroll tax rate is then determined
by trading off these two effects.
To sum up, collective annuities continue to have a potentially adverse redistributive
impact in this setting. However, this effect is mitigated by combining the collective
annuities with a redistributive pension scheme. In other words, when bundled with a
suitably designed pension scheme collective annuities may be desirable (even when they
are not more efficient than private annuities).
4 Non linear scheme
So far we have concentrated on linear policies. First we have assumed that some fraction
of private saving (which is otherwise freely chosen) is allocated to collective annuities.
Then we have introduced a linear pension scheme under which a proportional payroll
tax was used to finance annuitized pension benefits. We have seen that there is a
conflict between the redistributive pension scheme and the regressivity of the underlying
collective annuitization. A natural question to ask at this stage is whether the results
reflect fundamental properties of collective annuities or instead are mere artifacts of the
(artificial) restrictions imposed on the different policies.
To study the robustness of this result we shall now take a different view on this
problem. Rather than specifying arbitrary (linearity) restrictions on the policy we now
characterize the “best” (utilitarian) allocation that can be achieved given the available
information and study how is can be implemented through a (possibly nonlinear) pension
system that may or may not rely on annuitization. For reasons that will become clear
below, we adopt a slightly different specification of preferences in this section and assume
that utility is given by
u (ci)− h (ci) + πiu (di) . (19)
This specification differs from (1) in that labor supply is now separable from the other
13
goods. Productivity wi, labor supply, ci and longevity πi cannot be observed. There
are two types of individuals, indexed i = 1, 2, characterized each by a vector (wi, πi).
Type 2 is the more productive one so that we have w2 ≥ w1. Regarding life expectancy
we continue to concentrate on the case of positive correlation (π2 ≥ π1) in which the
more productive also have a higher survival probability. This is the empirically most
relevant case on which we have concentrated in the previous sections. The second case
with π2 ≤ π1 is empirically less appealing but constitutes an interesting benchmark.
Another departure from the analysis in the previous sections is that we allow for the
introduction of social weighs that may be negatively correlated to longevity. To keep
the notation simple, we take ϕ1 = ϕ and ϕ2 = 1. In other words, when π1 < π2 we set
ϕ1 ≥ 1 and when π1 > π2 we set ϕ1 ≤ 1.
The Lagrangian of this problem can be expressed as:
LNL =
2X
i
ni [ϕi (u (ci)− h (ci) + πiu (di))− μ (ci + πidi − wici)]
+λ1
∙
u (c1)− h
µ
y1
w1
¶
+ π1u (d1)− u (c1)h
µ
y1
w2
¶
− π1u (d2)
¸
+λ2
∙
u (c2)− h
µ
y2
w2
¶
+ π2u (d2)− u (c2) + h
µ
y2
w1
¶
− π2u (d1)
¸
, (20)
where λ1, λ2 and μ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive constraints
and the resource constraint. This yields the following FOCs:
∂LNL
∂c1
= n1
£
ϕu0 (c1)− μ
¤
+ (λ1 − λ2)u0 (c1) = 0, (21)
∂LNL
∂c2
= n2
£
u0 (c2)− μ
¤
+ (λ2 − λ1)u0 (c2) = 0, (22)
∂LNL
∂d1
= n1π1
£
ϕu0 (d1)− μ
¤
+ (λ1π1 − λ2π2)u0 (d1) = 0, (23)
∂LNL
∂d2
= n2π2
£
u0 (d2)− μ
¤
+ (λ2π2 − λ1π1)u0 (d2) = 0, (24)
∂LNL
∂y1
= −n1
∙
ϕh0
µ
y1
w1
¶
1
w1
− μ
¸
− λ1h0
µ
y1
w1
¶
1
w1
+ λ2h0
µ
y1
w2
¶
1
w2
= 0, (25)
∂LNL
∂y2
= −n2
∙
h0
µ
y2
w2
¶
1
w2
− μ
¸
− λ2h0
µ
y2
w2
¶
1
w2
+ λ1h0
µ
y2
w1
¶
1
w1
= 0. (26)
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4.1 First-best
As a benchmark, we study the first-best allocation that can be achieved when all vari-
ables are publicly observable. To derive this solution we can use (21)—(26) and set
λ1 = λ2 = 0 (i.e., ignore the incentive constraints). This yields
ϕu0 (c1) = u0 (c2) ;
u0 (c2)
u0 (d2)
=
u0 (c1)
u0 (d1)
= 1 ; h0 (ci) = u0 (ci)wi, (27)
which implies c2 ≥ c1 (with a strict inequality when w2 > w1). It also implies c1 =
d1 T c2 = d2 for ϕ T 1. In words, consumption levels are equalized between periods and
adjusted for differences in longevity. Observe that longevity affects the solution only
through the social weights. In the utilitarian case when ϕ = 1, consumption levels do
not depend on π0s. Either way, the more productive individuals work more than the
less productive.
To decentralize this solution one needs (personalized) lump-sum taxes and transfers.
Earnings would not be taxed and individuals could invest their savings in fair annuities.
We now turn to the second-best problem. First, we look at the utilitarian case and
then we introduce social weights.
4.2 Second-best in a utilitarian case
The first-best solution is not feasible when individual types (productivities and survival
probabilities) are not observable. More precisely, it follows from (27) that the incentive
constraint of individual 2 is violated as long as w2 > w1. This is because consumption
levels are equalized but the productive have to work more. Note that this is true
irrespective of the correlation between w and π.
Let us now turn to the second-best solution. Assume that the incentive constraint
that is violated at the first-best is also the one that is binding in the second-best so that
we have λ2 > 0 and λ1 = 0. The FOC (21)—(26) can then be rearranged as follows
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u0 (c2)
u0 (d2)
= 1 ; h0
µ
y2
w2
¶
= u0 (c2)w2, (28)
u0 (c1)
u0 (d1)
=
n1 − λ2
π2
π1
n1 − λ2
, (29)
h0
µ
y1
w1
¶
u0 (c1)
= w1
∙
1 +
λ2
μn1
µ
h0
µ
y1
w2
¶
1
w2
− h0
µ
y1
w1
¶
1
w1
¶¸
< w1. (30)
Condition (28) yields the traditional no distortion at the top property. Equation (30) is
also standard and implies a positive marginal (payroll) tax rate on the low productivity
type’s labor income. The interesting expression from the perspective of this paper is
(29) which shows how the trade-off between c1 and d1 is distorted. When π1 = π2 we
have a single dimension of heterogeneity and (under separable preferences) the Atkinson
and Stiglitz property applies.12 This means that all savings are invested in private
(fair) annuities which are not taxed. There is nothing which resembles a collective
annuity in this solution. When π1 < π2 (positive correlation between w and π) we have
u0 (c1) /u0 (d1) < 1 so that there is a downward distortion on d1 (compared to c1). The
way this distortion translates into the tax policy depends on the specific implementation.
One possibility is to have a tax on type 1’s savings which otherwise are invested in a fair
annuity. Alternatively, one can directly provide an annuity to type 1 which offers an
implicit return that is smaller than 1/π1. Since type 2 faces an undistorted trade-off the
implicit return of his annuity is 1/π2. Consequently, the second-best implies a certain
equalization of the return of annuities between individuals. However, this equalization
is not in general going to be complete so that the solution cannot be implemented by a
simple collective annuity.
4.3 Second-best solution with social weights
We now introduce ϕ as a social weight for individuals 1. As long as λ2 > 0, λ1 = 0,
qualitative results are unchanged. Focusing on the trade-off between c and d, there is
12And it is to have this as a benchmark that we have adopted the separable specification in this
section.
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no distortion for individuals 2 and for individuals 1, we have
u0 (c1)
u0 (c2)
=
ϕn1 − λ2
π2
π1
ϕn1 − λ2
< 1. (31)
Consequently, the sign of the distortion does not change with ϕ. However, one easily
verifies that the middle term in (31) increases with ϕ. Consequently, the magnitude of
the distortion decreases as the weight put on the short-lived individual increases. In the
previous subsection we have argued that this distortion reduces the wedge between the
returns of individual annuities. A higher social weight on type 1 individuals reverses this
effect and increases the wedge so that we move further away from collective annuities.
In Sections 2 and 3 we have not explicitly considered social weights, but we have argued
that such weights would further weaken the case for collective annuities. The results we
have just discussed show that this remains true with nonlinear instruments.
Finally, let us have a look at the case of negative correlation π1 > π2. Assume
further that the social weights given on the long-lived individuals is very low. It is then
not impossible to have λ2 = 0 and λ1 > 0. In that case, there is no distortion on the
choice of c1 and d1 but for 2 we have:
u0 (c2)
u0 (d2)
=
n2 − λ1
π1
π2
n2 − λ1
> 1.
In words, we have a subsidy on saving by individuals 2. This brings us even further
away from collective annuities because the net returns to individual annuities are further
apart than in an actuarially fair world.
5 Conclusion
One of the properties of most public pension schemes is not only to force people to
save but also to provide them with a constant flow of income after retirement. Such a
collective and mandatory annuitization is known to be more cost-efficient than market
based annuities. Their drawback is to penalize workers with short lifetime as benefits
are longevity invariant.
In this paper we have studied the desirability of collective annuities (from a utili-
tarian perspective) in a number of different settings. First, we have considered the case
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where collective annuitization is introduced on a stand alone basis (i.e., not combined
with a public pension system). Specifically, we have assumed that some fraction of
private savings (which is otherwise freely chosen) is allocated to collective annuities. In
that setting, the case for collective annuities is weak, except if the loading factor on
private annuities is very large. The reason is that by redistributing from the short-lived
to the long-lived, collective annuities also redistribute from low to high productivity in-
dividuals (under the plausible assumption of positive correlation between productivity
and longevity).
Next, we have considered collective annuities that are bundled with a public pension
system. We have shown that a purely contributive system is welfare improving only if
the redistribution from short-lived to long-lived individuals dominates the redistribution
from high income to low income individuals. A pension system that provides flat rate
benefits is more likely to be welfare improving. However, its generosity is mitigated by
the regressive effect of collective annuitization. Finally, in a non linear taxation setting,
collective annuities as such are not needed to implement the second-best allocation.
However, we show that the wedge between the returns of individual annuities ought to
smaller then in an actuarially fair world. This can be seen as a step towards collective
annuities but an incomplete step because the rates of return are never equalized across
type (as they are for collective annuities).
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Appendix
We want to establish that a more unequal distribution of w leads to an increase in
cov (γ, π) . The is done in the following lemma where we compare the covariance with
two distributions of w (with the same average wage). The first distribution implies equal
wages for everyone. The second distribution implies wages that are increasing with π.
We establish this property for the case where w and π are increasing function of i and
where the type space is continuous.
Lemma 1 Consider two distributions (w1 (i) , π (i)) and (w2 (i) , π (i)) each character-
ized by the same density n (i) defined over the interval [i−, i+] where w1 (i) = w for
every i ∈ [i−, i+] and w¯2 =
R i+
i−
w (i)n (i) di = w. Further denote
γj (i) =
π (i) z (wj (i)) / (1 + π (i))R i+
i−
[π (i) z (wj (i)) / (1 + π (i))]n (i) di
where z (wj (i)) = wj (i) l (wj (i)) − h (l (wj (i))) is an increasing function of wj (i).
Then if w2 (i) and π (i) are both increasing with i, cov (γ1, π) < cov (γ2, π).
Proof. Since w¯2 = w¯1 = w and E
¡
γj
¢
= 1 for j = 1, 2, one has:
cov (γ1, π)− cov (γ2, π) = E (πγ1)−E (πγ2)
=
Z i+
i−
π (i)
"
π (i) z (w1 (i)) / (1 + π (i))R i+
i−
[π (i) z (w1 (i)) / (1 + π (i))]n (i) di
− π (i) z (w2 (i)) / (1 + π (i))R i+
i−
[π (i) z (w2 (i)) / (1 + π (i))]n (i) di
#
n (i) di
Denoting K (i) = π (i) / (1 + π (i)), and using w1 (i) = w for every i ∈ [i−, i+] , this
can be rewritten as
cov (γ1, π)− cov (γ2, π)
=
∆ (i+)n (i)³R i+
i−
π (i) / (1 + π (i))n (i) di
´³R i+
i−
π (i) z (w2 (i)) / (1 + π (i))n (i) di
´di (A1)
where
∆ (i+) =
µZ i+
i−
π (i)K (i)n (i) di
¶µZ i+
i−
z (w2 (i))K (i)n (i) di
¶
−
µZ i+
i−
π (i) z (w2 (i))K (i)n (i) di
¶µZ i+
i−
K (i)n (i) di
¶
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Since the denominator of (A1) is positive, the sign of cov (γ1, π) − cov (γ2, π) thus
only depends upon the sign of the numerator of (A1).
Denote
∆ (i∗) =
µZ i∗
i−
π (i)K (i)n (i) di
¶µZ i∗
i−
z (w2 (i))K (i)n (i) di
¶
−
µZ i∗
i−
π (i) z (w2 (i))K (i)n (i) di
¶µZ i∗
i−
K (i)n (i) di
¶
.
It is straightforward to see that ∆ (i−) = 0. Moreover, for any i∗ ∈ [i−, i+],
d (∆ (i∗))
di∗
=
K (i∗)n (i∗)
∙
π (i∗)
µZ i∗
i−
z (w2 (i))K (i)n (i) di
¶
+ z (w2 (i∗))
µZ i∗
i−
π (i)K (i)n (i) di
¶¸
−K (i∗)n (i∗)
∙
π (i∗) z (w2 (i∗))
µZ i∗
i−
K (i)n (i) di
¶
+
µZ i∗
i−
π (i) z (w2 (i))K (i)n (i) di
¶¸
Factorizing by K (i∗)π (i∗) z (w2 (i∗))n (i∗), this yields
d (∆ (i∗))
di∗
= K (i∗)π (i∗) z (w2 (i∗))n (i∗)
∙Z i∗
i−
K (i)
µ
z (w2 (i))
z (w2 (i∗))
− 1
¶µ
1− π (i)
π (i∗)
¶
n (i) di
¸
Since π (i) and z (w2 (i)) are both increasing with i, one always haveµ
z (w2 (i))
z (w2 (i∗))
− 1
¶µ
1− π (i)
π (i∗)
¶
< 0
so that d (∆ (i∗)) /di∗ < 0. Together with ∆ (i−) = 0, this shows that ∆ (i∗) is negative
for every i∗ and in particular for i∗ = i+. The numerator in (A1) is thus negative while
the denominator is positive so that cov (γ1, π)−cov (γ2, π) < 0 which proves the lemma.
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